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• Limitations and Future Research
Background
 Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in the National 
Airspace System (NAS): 
 Demand has skyrocketed for routine access to the NAS
 Military, scientific, national security and emergency management 
applications have all called for easier admittance
 Currently required to obtain Certificate of Authorization 
(COA), a time consuming, restrictive process
 Also requires air traffic controllers (ATC) to block airspace, which 
can reduce airspace efficiency
Background
 Barriers to Integration: 
 Lack of agreed upon minimum performance standards
 A chief concern is contingency management
 How will UAS deal with emergency events, such as the loss of the 
command and control link (i.e., lost link)?
 How will procedures impact the rest of the system?
 Standardized and predictable contingency 
management procedures are essential to integration
Background
 Current Behaviors: 
 UAS response to contingency events are agreed upon 
within individual COAs with the FAA
 UAS may:
 Return to base
 Continue to destination
 Return to mission altitude
Background
 Purpose of Study: 
 Examine the impact of existing UAS contingency 
management procedures on air traffic control (ATC)
 How do current UAS behaviors impact a controller’s ability to 
maintain a safe and efficient airspace?
 How do the behaviors impact controller’s self-reported 
workload?
 Hypothesis:
 More sudden and/or sizable maneuvers would negatively impact 
ATC performance and workload
 Smaller maneuvers would have less impact on surrounding traffic
 Less immediate maneuvers would provide time for pilot to inform ATC
Method
 Contingency Behavior
 Four current contingency behaviors were modeled in this 
study
 3 behaviors for responding to lost link
 1 behavior for responding to severe loss in oil pressure
 Developed through:
 Review of existing documentation
 MQ-9 flight manual
 Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems CONOPS
 Semi-structured interviews 
 3 current UAS pilots from 2 different platforms
Method
 Contingency Behavior
ID Event Contingency Behavior Time to Execute
C1 N/A N/A N/A
C2 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 1 min
C3 Lost Link Return to Base (incl. 180° turn) 8 min
C4 Lost Link Maintain Course (Return to Mission 
Altitude)
1 min
C5 Drop in Oil 
Pressure
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Land at Emergency Site (incl. descent of 
maximum 10000ft)
Immediate
• Hypothesize that C3 and C4 will be least impactful on ATC 
performance
• C2 and C5 most impactful
Method
 Experimental Design
 One-Way Repeated Measures Factorial
 Contingency Behavior (5 levels, within subjects)
 Counterbalanced order of presentation within each block across participants
 Block (2 levels; within subjects)
 No systematic difference between levels
 Experimental Scenarios
 2 Blocks
 5 experimental runs per block
 Experimental runs lasted 17 min
 Each trial followed up by workload and general questionnaire
Method
 Participants
 14 Retired Controllers (Male):
 Civilian ATC Experience:
 TRACON – 14/14 (26 years on avg.)
 13/14 had experience working East Feeder
 Tower – 10/14
 Center – 2/14
 Military ATC Experience:
 TRACON – 5/14
 Tower – 4/14
Method
 Apparatus
 Multi Aircraft Control System (MACS) provided controller 
display
 Display System Replacement (DSR) presentation of Southern 
California TRACON [East Feeder/ZLA20]
 Hybrid sector – airspace positively controlled from surface to FL230
 Participants used keyboard and mouse for inputs
Method
 Apparatus
 Vigilant Spirit Control Station (VSCS) provided 
simulated UAS ground control station
 Allowed for simulated injection events (e.g., loss link and 
severe oil loss)
 UAS pilot provided  with script when coordinating with ATC 
following contingencies
 MQ1 Predator (Modified)
 Speed: 110 knots
 Mission Alt: 14000 MSL




 Designed off of a busy, current day at SoCal TRACON
 Included arrivals into LAX and ONT, as well as overflights (in 
addition to single UAS)
 Manned aircraft were level when entering sector




 Maintain safe separation
 3nm and 1000ft (approach airspace separation requirements)
 Ensure LAX arrivals meet appropriate altitude restrictions.
 LAX arrivals required to exit sector @SKOLL at 10000 MSL
 Descent ONT arrivals to 5000 MSL for visual approach
 No coordination with ONT tower
 Manage overflights (including UAS)
 Training
 Trained on MACS software and overall sector operations
 Included brief on UAS characteristics and potential contingencies
 3 practice scenarios (2 with only manned AC, 1 with UAS)





 Number of Losses of 
Separation (violation of 3nm 
and 1000ft)
 Workload
 Handoff Accept Time 
 Time elapsed between 
adjacent sector’s initial 
handoff and experimental 
controller’s acceptance)
 Efficiency
 Avg. time in sector per AC
 Avg. distance flown per AC
 Subjective Ratings
 NASA-Task Load Index 
 Mental Demand, Physical Demand, 
Temporal Demand, Performance 
Degradation, Effort and Frustration
 Post-Trial Questionnaire
 Assessed impact of contingencies on 
controller’s self reported separation 
strategies
 Post-Simulation Questionnaire
 Queried controllers on overall 
simulation fidelity and compared 
across levels of Contingency Behavior
 Analysis




– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on 
Number of LOS (p>.05)
• LOS were low across all levels of Contingency Behavior
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)




– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on 
number of handoff accept time (p>.05)
• Handoff accept times were low and stable across conditions
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)




– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on 
Distance Through Sector (p>.05)
• Controllers remarkably consistent between conditions
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)




– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on Time 
Through Sector (p>.05)
• Controllers consistent across conditions
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)




– No significant main effect of Contingency Behavior on any 
of controller’s self-reported workload scales (p’s>.05)
• Mental, Physical and Effort demands slightly above average
• Temporal, Frustration and Performance demands slightly below
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)








– No significant effect on any of the 8 questions (p’s>.05)
• Rating: 0 (Strongly Disagree) – 5 (Strongly Agree)
– Questions included:
• Impact on ability to safely/efficiently manage sector
• Impact on situation 
awareness
• Predictability of 
behavior
• Buffer size for UAS
Label Description
C1 No contingency (baseline)
C2 Return to base (1 minute)
C3 Return to base (8 minutes)






– Controller’s were asked their preferred contingency 





– For all 3 questions controllers responded:
• C4 (Return to Mission Alt/Maintain Pre-Programmed Course)
• C3 (Return to Base in 8min)
• C2 (Return to Base in 1min)
• C1 (Emergency Landing)
Conclusion
 Study suggests:
– Contrary to hypothesis, current contingencies found to 
have no positive or negative effects on controller 
performance or subjective reports
– No differences between contingencies or relative to 
baseline condition (with no contingency event)
• Losses of separation, handoff accept times, time and distance 
through sector saw no significant effects
• Workload, post trial and post simulation questionnaires also failed 
to see effects
– However, when asked, controllers found the Return to 
Altitude/Maintain Course & the 8 minute Return to Base 
contingencies to be the least impactful
• Emergency landing contingency was rated as most impactful
Conclusion
 Explanation of findings
– Controllers commented that dealing with a single UAS 
(even when operating under a variety of contingency 
procedures) was not problematic
• Nearly all controllers noted that they frequently dealt with 
“special” AC while working ZLA20 (East Feeder)
– DEA and FBI routinely flew helicopters or fixed-wing AC at low 
altitudes with unpredictable routing
• Participants had worked East Feeder, likely very motivated/talented 
controllers
– Suggests controllers’ skill sets were robust enough to 
accommodate a single, unpredictable, slow-moving AC




– No “true” baseline scenario – i.e., trial without UAS present
• May have obscured comparisons
– Looked only at approach airspace that was relatively 
conflict free
• Used a hybrid sector (part approach, part center) with traffic that 
was flying level
• Class A (no VFR included in scenario)
Conclusion
 Recommendations for Future Research:
– Present the contingencies within more difficult contexts
• Higher density traffic
• Different airspace (e.g., Class E or D)
• Script complex conflictions with the UA
– Simulate different types of contingencies
• Context-sensitive contingencies
– UAS behavior is dictated by the current airspace or operation
• Design purposefully disruptive contingencies to demonstrate 
sensitivity of our metrics
– May make it easier to accept null hypothesis
– NORTHCOMM is currently testing impact of contingency 
operations in flight test conditions
 Questions?
Conclusion
